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COMMENTS
STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTIONS
These people are being sued for the crimes of speaking up at City
Council and Planning Commission meetings and talking to their
neighbors. This lawsuit is an attempt to stop residents from voicing
their concerns in violation of their 1st Amendment rights.1
[W]e shudder to think of the chill our ruling would have on the
exercise of freedom of speech and the right to petition were we to
allow this lawsuit to proceed. The cost to society in terms of the
threat to our liberty and freedom is beyond calculation.2
The court perceives this, with a great deal of alarm, as part of a
growing trend of what have come to be known as "SLAPP suits."
3
INTRODUCTION
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation ("SLAPPs") 4 are a response by
1. Fiore, Developers Slap Neighborhood Protesters With Suit, LA. Times, Aug. 31, 1990, Metro
sec., pt. B, at 10, col. 1 (quoting attorney Marc Allen Coleman). "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Webb v. Fury, 167 W. Va. 434,460,282 S.E.2d 28,43 (1981) (discussed in Section IV.A.,
infra).
3. Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524-25 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (The court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss claims of conspiracy, interference with prospective economic
advantage, slander, and claims for three million dollars in compensatory and one million dollars in
punitive damages. The defendants successfully petitioned to have a roadway they lived on vacated
as a public highway after the plaintiff developer announced plans for a new subdivision which would
have used that road as a main access route.), 744 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (granting defendant's
motions for sanctions and attorney's fees). See also note 106, infra.
4. This term was coined by two University of Denver professors, Penelope Canan and George
W. Pring. Two of their published works examine data collected on 100 SLAPPs. Their initial studies
establish the qualitative and quantitative analysis of this phenomenon. See Canan & Pring, Studying
StrategicLawsuitsAgainst PublicParticipation: Mixing Quantitative and QualitativeApproaches, 22 LAW
& Soc'Y RLrv. 385 (1988) [hereinafter Canan & Pring 1]; Canan & Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation, 35 Soc. PROBS. 506 (1988) [hereinafter Canan & Pring 2]. Subsequently, Canan
and Pring's study was expanded to examine a total of 228 SLAPPS. See Pring, SLAPPs, Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVIL. L REv. 3 (1989); Canan, The SLPP from a
Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENvT. L. REv. 23 (1989).
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detrimentally affected parties to the activities of citizens who petition the
government.s SLAPPs are intended to silence those citizens.6 In doing so,
SLAPPs effectively deny vocal citizens their constitutional right to petition the
government. Currently, it appears unlikely that this abuse of the legal system
will be resolved without focused judicial or legislative action.
Accordingly, the goal of this Comment is to discuss the forms such focused
action may take. Section I of this Comment provides a background to the
problem. Section II enumerates and discusses the factors that must be
considered in formulating a solution to SLAPPs, as well as the limitations that
must be observed in implementing a solution. Section III analyzes eisting
responses to SLAPPs in light of those factors and limitations. Finally, Section
IV analyzes proposed responses to SLAPPs and recommends modifications to
maximize the success of those responses.7 The proposed solutions consist of a
judicial solution suggested in 1981 by the dissenting justice in Webb v. FulJ, 8 and
a legislative solution currently under consideration in California.9
I. BACKGROUND
A An Examination of the Problem
The SLAPP problem may be understood best by examining the difficulties in
identifying SLAPPs, the types of parties who file SLAPPs, the motivations for
filing SLAPPs, and the reasons that SLAPPs are effective.
The difficulties in identifying a suit as a SLAPP are twofold. First, the exact
criteria for calling a suit a SLAPP are not settled. The researchers who initially
identified this phenomena, Professors Canan and Pring, limit their definition of
SLAPPs to suits based on advocacy before the government regarding a matter
5. The right to petition encompasses "any attempt to promote or discourage governmental
action, and in most cases governs activity also protected by the right to free speech." Note, The
Misapplication of the Noerr.Pennington Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L.
RLv. 1243, 1244 (1984). "It protects communications to all governmental departments, including
courts and administrative agencies as well as the executive and the legislature. Sit-ins and other
protest demonstrations are among the activities implicitly recognized as petitions. The precise
definition of petition is not carved in stone, but changes with political norms and technological
advances to encourage communication between the people and their representatives." Id. at 1247
(footnotes omitted). But see Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress
of Grievances, 96 YALE LI. 142 (1986), which argues that the original right to petition was not merely
a variant of free speech directed towards government but was also an indispensable part of the
colonial legislative process which was eliminated during the pre-Civil War slavery crisis.
6. "Definitionally, litigation of this type claims injury from citizen contact with a government
official, agency, or the electorate on a substantive issue of public significance." Canan & Pring 1, supra
note 4, at 386 (emphasis omitted).
7. Outside the scope of this Comment is any analysis of the actual extent of SLAPP's chilling
effect on public participation and public policy making.
8. Webb, 167 W. Va. at 460, 282 S.E.2d at 43 (Neely, J., dissenting).
9. Though overwhelmingly passed by the legislature, this legislation was vetoed by the
Governor of California in 1990. It has recently been reintroduced. See infra Section IV.B.
[Vol. 27
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of "public interest or concern." 10 This definition is too restrictive. The first
amendment protects all legitimate petitioning of government regardless of its
objective.1 The definition of SLAPPs must focus solely on the SLAPP
plaintiffs motive in suing, not the defendant's objective in petitioning. If the
suit is intended to intimidate and thus deny citizens their first amendment rights,
the suit is a SLAPP.
Following Canan and Pring's more limited definition also creates a loophole
through which many SLAPPs might slip to the detriment of defendants. In order
to trigger a SLAPP solution based on the Canan and Pring definition, the
defendant's actions must be prompted by an issue of public interest or concern.
This creates an additional factual issue that must be decided at trial, extending
the resolution of the SLAPP and increasing the risk of an adverse judgment for
the defendant.13 This Comment takes the position that the defendant's motives
in petitioning the government should be irrelevant in determining whether a suit
is a SLAPP.
The second difficulty in identifying SLAPPs arises in the context of the SLAPP
plaintiff's complaint. In a SLAPP complaint, the defendant's petitioning actions
are redrawn, causing the dispute to appear as a tort case' 4 involving claims such
as defamation, conspiracy, or interference with prospective economic advan-
tage.15 In turn, the difficulty in distinguishing SLAPPS from legitimate tort
10. Canan and Pring used four criteria to identify the SLAPPs they studied:
1. a civil complaint or counterclaim (for monetary damages and/or injunction),
2. filed against non-governmental individuals and/or groups,
3. because of their communications to a government body, official, or the electorate,
4. on an issue of some public interest or concern.
Pring, supra note 4, at 7-8. The first element was expanded from Canan and Pring's earlier definition
of "a civil claim for money damages." Canan & Pring 1, supra note 4, at 387. Also, the fourth prong
of the test is limited by Canan and Pring to areas of "broader, more common public interest:' a at
387 n.5.
11. The more common perception of these suits seems to include more self-interested
petitioning. See Westfield Partners, 740 F. Supp. 523, where the court characterized a suit to retaliate
against homeowners' self-interested behavior as a SLAPP. The Pring and Canan criteria also might
be biased against selecting suits where the abuse of the legal process was committed by environmen-
talists. Brooks, LesMains Sales: The Ethical and Political Implications of SLAPP Suits, 7 PACE ENvn..
L. RE'V. 61, 66 (1989).
12. The Supreme Court has stated "[t]he right of the people to inform their representatives
in government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be
made to depend upon their intent in doing so.' Eastern Railroads Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,139 (1961). "Noerr held that the right to engage in political activity
cannot be curtailed simply because one has a financial interest in the outcome of the political
controversy involved... :' Webb, 167 W. Va. at 461, 282 S.E.2d at 44 (Neely, J., dissenting).
13. See infra Section II.A. for a discussion of the ramifications of increased delay and risk.
14. A tort case is defined as: "A major classification category for civil cases that includes cases
involving a court action resulting from an injury or wrong committed either against a person or
against a person's property by a party who either did something that he was obligated not to do, or
failed to do something that he was obligated to do." CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS
& THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT MODEL STATLCAL DIRECTORY 61
(1989). This definition is used when discussing tort case statistics in notes 35, 36, 68 & 105, infra.
15. The six claims most frequently observed were defamation, business torts, conspiracy,
judicial process abuse, constitutional rights, and nuisance. Canan & Pring 2, supra note 4, at 511.
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cases makes it difficult to determine the extent of the problem. Although it is
estimated that thousands of SLAPPs are now being filed annually,16 the total
number of these suits filed over the last several years is unknown because they
are so difficult to recognize among the thousands of similar, but legitimate
lawsuits filed.' 7 Equally important, the number of such suits merely threatened
and the rate of success of those threats is, and probably will remain, unknown. 8
SLAPPs are generally filed by large, well-financed organizations against private
citizens or local citizen's groups whose political activism may be detrimental to
the organization's business interests.19 The classic example of a SLAPP is a
land developer suing area residents who are protesting a new development.
However, SLAPPs are not limited to just those types of parties.20 Defendants
have included large public interest organizations such as the National Organiza-
tion of Women,2' the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People," and the Sierra Club2 Plaintiffs have included government agencies
such as state attorneys general24 and police departments.25 Nevertheless, the
most important plaintiffs remain business organizations (or their representatives)
simply because this group makes up the vast majority of the SLAPP filers.2s
Unlike legitimate lawsuits, SLAPPs are not filed to seek compensation or to
make right a perceived wrong. Rather they are filed for any of four motives:
retaliation for successful opposition, discouraging future opposition, intimidation,
and as a strategic tool in a political battle.27 These motives not only indicate
16. Dellios, Builder's Suit Puts Clamp on PicketingHomeowners, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 4,1990,
at 1, col. D (Dupage Sports Final ed.). But see Pring, supra note 4, at 5, estimating that only
"hundreds" are filed each year.
17. Penelope Canan, co-author of the most comprehensive quantitative research on SLAPPs
to date, stated: "We will never know exactly how many of these lawsuits exist, because they are
designed to mask their actual intent." Colino, SLAPP-Happy, STUDENT LAWYER, Mar. 1990, at 20.
18. Canan, supra note 4, at 30.
19. In the Canan and Pring study, three business or economically motivated categories made
up 84% of the SLAPP filers C'individual participants, economic role" 20%; "individual participants,
occupational role" 25%; "group participants, industry group" 39%). "Individual participants citizen"
made up 38% of the targets. "Public Interest Groups" and "Civic/Social Organizations" totaled 27%,
combined. Canan & Pring 2, supra note 4, at 511, table I.
20. Frequent SLAPP filers, in addition to real estate developers, are property owners, police
officers, alleged polluters, public utilities, and state or local governments. SLAPP filers and targets
represent the full political spectrum from radical liberals to ultra-conservatives. Canan & Pring 1,
supra note 4, at 389.
21. Missouriv. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (attorney general of Missouri suing on behalf of boycotted
businesses).
22. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290 (Miss. 1980), amended, 405 So. 2d.
115 (Miss. 1981), rev'd and remanded, 458 U.S. 886 (1982), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 898 (1982).
23. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
24. Missouri 467 F. Supp. 289.
25. Sierra Club, 349 F. Supp. 934.
26. See supra note 19.
27. Canan, supra note 4, at 30. "These motives are: (1) the intent to retaliate for successful
opposition on an issue of public interest; (2) the attempt to prevent expected future, competent
opposition on subsequent public policy issues; (3) the intent to intimidate and, generally, to send a
message that opposition will be punished; and (4) a view of litigation and the use of the court system
[Vol. 27
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that SLAPPs are an abusive manipulation of the American legal system, but also
show why the existing safeguards are insufficient to deal with this abuse. The
safeguards found in our legal system are designed to control and check abusive
behavior which occurs when parties are overzealous in their pursuit of a
favorable decision. An adverse judgment or the application of monetary
sanctions will harm the abusive party. However, in SLAPPs the motivation for
filing the suit has nothing to do with winning the case.2 The result is that
existing controls on abusive behavior have no effect.
In short, the major problem with SLAPPs, and consequently the reason they
deserve special attention (rather than treatment as another variation of frivolous
suits), is that their effectiveness comes from merely placing the dispute into the
legal system. SLAPPs are not intended to resolve the issue. Rather, filing a
SLAPP is a means of manipulating the dispute so the petitioning party is
immediately placed on the defensive. Once the dispute is in the court, almost
all the legal maneuvering of the defendant plays into the hands of the plaintiff.
The whole point of a SLAPP is to move the dispute out of the political arena
where the plaintiff has been losing, even if only long enough to let the plaintiff
fulfill its original objective.2'
In defining the SLAPP problem, it is also important to understand why these
suits are effective. These suits are effective for four main reasons: (1) they
transform the position of the parties; (2) they increase the risks involved; (3)
they divert the attention of the petitioning party;3° and (4) they delay resolution
of the original issue.
First, SLAPPs transform the position of the parties when the dispute is moved
from the political forum to the legal forum.3' This changes the balance of
power and resources between the parties. In the political forum, a group of
vocal individuals can wield significant clout by mobilizing the voting populace
against an elected body. They can also focus media attention on administrative
committees to ensure that the committees will abide by every rule and regulation
in handling the matters before them. In contrast, a court of law is relatively
isolated from this political pressure. A change in forum also transforms the
focus of the dispute. In the political forum, the controversy surrounds the
plaintiff's actions, but in court, much of the controversy surrounds the
as simply another tool in a strategy to win a political and/or economic battle." Id Note that these
motives, like the selection criteria, are also couched in terms of public interest.
28. Abrams, Strategic LawsuitsAganst Public Participation (SLAPP), Address by RobertAbrams,
Attorney General of New York State, 7 PACE ENVrL. L REv. 33,39 (1989).
29. This is particularly true when the SLAPP is filed while the petitioning is still ongoing so
the plaintiff can silence his or her current opposition. In a case where the plaintiff has already lost
in the political forum, the SLAPP is an attempt to undo that damage and, more importantly, chill
future petitioning in the community.
30. For a discussion of dispute transformation and its effect on the focus of the dispute, see
generally Mather & Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAw &
Soc'Y Rev. 782 (1980-81).
31. But see Brooks, supra note 11, at 62, which argues "transformation of a political struggle
into a legal battle is a time-honored trick perfected by the reformer, not the developer."
5
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defendant's actions.
Second, SLAPPs increase the financial risks faced by the citizen. Persons
acting on behalf of the community must now prepare a legal defense using their
individual resources. Prior to the filing of the lawsuit, these people are generally
fighting for some important goal such as an improved or undisturbed communi-
ty.32 The major cost they incur is a limited expenditure of their time. After the
SLAPP is filed, citizens risk becoming personally accountable to the plaintiff for
massive damages.33
Third, the suit diverts the defendant's attention away from the petitioning
activity and towards a legal defense.34 A SLAPP may become all-encompassing
for the defendant even though it is merely a strategic maneuver for the plaintiff.
The petitioning citizen's most valuable resource-time-is diverted to legal
defense.3 5  Also, in addition to their concerns about the quality of their
community which prompts them to become vocal in the first place, citizens must
now worry about the possibility of losing the suit and their financial indepen-
dence.
Finally, a SLAPP may delay the resolution of the original issue dramatically,s
causing the support of the community to wane and the purpose of the original
petitioning to become moot.37
Exacerbating the problem of SLAPPs is their "chilling effect. "38 The filing of,
or even the threat of filing, these types of suits may intimidate many people who
32. For example, a homeowner's association protested waiver by the city of Los Angeles of a
tract map requirement for a pre-development environmental impact report (EIR). The city attorney's
office, responding to the association's protests, informed the city that the requirement could not be
waived without violating the California Environmental Quality Act. As a result, the city planners
reversed their decision and ordered the EIR performed. The developers who sought the waiver, sued
the association claiming that the association was attempting to stall or block the development. The
claim for damages was unspecified but is estimated to be in the millions. The waiver of the EIR
requirement was the focus of the dispute in the political forum. The association's protest was the
focus of the legal forum. Garcia, Developers Slap Back at Their Opponents, L.A. Times, July 10,1990,
at B8, col. 1 (Ventura County ed.).
33. Personal accountability averaged $9,000,000 in the 228 SLAPPs studied. Canan, supra note
4, at 26. In the 100 cases analyzed in the initial Pring and Canan research, 70 requested quantified
damages (as opposed to "an amount to be determined at trial") ranging from $10,000 to $100 million
and averaging $7.4 million per lawsuit. Canan & Pring 2, supra note 4, at 512.
34. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 104, 118 (1988).
35. The value of defendant's time and expenses (other than legal fees and expenses) has been
estimated between $6,125 and $6,467 for federal and state tort cases in courts of general jurisdiction
throughout the country in 1985. J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, CoSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LmoATION 61 (1986).
36. SLAPP defendants generally "prevailed after an average of thirty-six months...." Canan,
supra note 4, at 26. The earlier Canan and Pring publications reported a mean of 31.4 months
(ranging from 3-140 months) for the 100 SLAPPs studied. Canan & Pring 2, supra note 4, at 512.
Compare this with the length of cases in federal courts for the statistical year 1986: 91% of tort cases
are terminated in less than three years (48.6% in one year or less) and 93.5% of all civil cases are
terminated in less than three years (61.1% in one year or less). T. DUNGWORTH & N. PACE,
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 21-23 (1990).
37. Colino, supra note 17, at 21.
38. See infra Section II.A.2. for a more thorough discussion of the causes of this chilling effect.
[V¢ol. 27
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become vocal in petitioning the government.39 These lawsuits may also
effectively eliminate the desire of many other people to petition government. 40
The number of people silenced by SLAPPs may never be known. Intimidation
will naturally exist anytime a community member is sued by an organization for
millions of dollars41 even if it is probable that the suit will be dismissed and
attorney's fees paid to the defendant. Probability is not something most people
will rely on when told that they may lose everything they have. It is much safer
to be quiet.42
SLAPPs should be distinguished from another means of intimidation called
"environmental countersuits. " 3 In this scenario, the original suit is filed to stop
some action which the plaintiff believes is detrimental to the environment. The
defendant countersues solely to intimidate the plaintiff. These countersuits are
distinguishable from SLAPPs for three reasons. First, they have a different
procedural posture which requires a different procedural solution. Second, they
are only used to counter lawsuits initiated by other parties so the original
plaintiff will have anticipated both a legal battle and the possibility of a
countersuit. In contrast, SLAPPs are initiated against citizens who are using
only the political process to air their grievances. Those citizens are not
anticipating, are not prepared for, and should not be subjected to legal action.
Finally, the chilling effect inherent in SLAPPs is probably not as significant in
countersuits.44
B. The Need for Eliminating SLAPPs
This Comment relies on the premise that SLAPPs are an abuse of the legal
system that must be eliminated. This abuse unjustly harms SLAPP defendants
and undermines the public's confidence in the American legal system.45
39. See Pell, Lawsuits That Chill Local Politics, 4 CAuIF. LAw., Feb. 1984, at 44. See generally
Canan & Pring 1; Canan & Ping 2, supra note 4.
40. Determining the actual extent of this "chilling effect" is one of the goals of the Canan and
Pring research. They have not yet released a conclusion based on their studies. Canan & Pring 2,
supra note 4, at 516. The common perception appears to be these suits do have a chilling effect and
reduce the number of people interested in petitioning government.
41. See supra note 33.
42. Occasionally, the filing of these suits forces citizens to take a stand, making them even
more vocal. After the successful defense of her suit, one SLAPP suit defendant was motivated to run
for city council and was elected to a seat there. Colino, supra note 17, at 21. It is unlikely, however,
that these isolated cases outweigh the voices of the people intimidated into never petitioning again.
43. See Sive, Countersuits, Delay, Intimidation Caused by Public Interest Suits, Nat'l LJ., June
19, 1989, at 26, col. 1 (environmental law sec.). See also Note, Counterclaim and Countersut
Harssnent of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problems, Its Implications, and Proposed Solutions,
74 MicH. L REv. 106 (1975).
44. Although this chilling effect could conceivably reduce the number of individuals willing to
act as private attorneys general under state and federal laws, it should not reduce the efforts of well
represented environmental organizations. Note, supra note 43, at 110.
45. Abuse of the judicial process "needlessly delays resolution of disputes. It provides an
unwarranted advantage to more prosperous litigants who have the resources to bury their opponents
in irrelevant paper. Finally, such abuse serves to place the entire legal system in disrepute." ABA
CENTER FOR PROFEsSIONAL RFSPONSIBILrITY, JuDiciAL RESPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT IV.3 (1984)
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This premise rests on two main points. First, the courts are not the proper
forum for this type of dispute resolution. SLAPP plaintiffs would urge that the
courts are intended to provide a forum for dispute resolution; therefore, SLAPPs
are a legitimate use of the courts because they are brought when a dispute arises
between activists and the potential plaintiffs. SLAPP plaintiffs would also argue
that the biggest problem with SLAPPs is that the law of torts does not yet
recognize the proper cause of action for this type of dispute. More accurately,
however, a court is the appropriate place for resolving disputes only where one
party is injured by the other in violation of the law. SLAPPs are lawsuits used
to deny citizens the ability to exercise their right to petition the government, not
to redress legal violations, and are therefore brought for harassment purposes
only. In SLAPP disputes there is, by definition, no violation of the law even
though one side may be hurt." The plaintiffs loss is the unfortunate but
unavoidable result of political decision making.
Second, SLAPPs reduce citizen petitioning, which in turn reduces citizen
communication to government officials. The resulting lack of citizen input will
only harm the representative form of public policy making practiced in this
country.47  In the United States, political involvement other than voting is
limited to approximately ten percent of the voting population.4 This ten
percent is therefore responsible for articulating most of the public opinion upon
which local legislative and administrative bodies rely in making public policy
decisions. Consequently, if the "chilling effect" of SLAPPs becomes widespread,
access to the opinions of the American people will be restricted even further.
This could cause this country's republican form of government to become less
representational since elected officials will have to rely heavily on the feedback
they receive during the election campaign to guide their entire term in office.
[hereinafter JUDIcIAL RESPONSES].
46. This whole line of argument may create an apparent tautology based on the way in which
the law develops. Either there is no cause of action and no legally recognized injury so the
defendant's behavior is legal or the defendant's behavior is only legal until the courts recognize the
injury and a cause of action. That is, the action is legal until it is declared illegal. However, the
problem is illusory because petitioning the government must always remain a protected activity in this
country regardless of its effect on a potential SLAPP plaintiff.
47. Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984).
"Citizen access to the institutions of government constitutes one of the foundations upon which our
republican form of government is premised. In a representative democracy government acts on behalf
of the people, and effective representation depends to a large extent upon the ability of the people
to make their wishes known to governmental officials acting on their behalf." Id. at 1364.
48. Canan & Pring 2, supra note 4, at 515 (citing L MILBRArrH, PoLrMCAL PAR1ICIPATION:
How AND WHY PEOPLE Gur INVOLVED IN PoLrncs (1965)). The number of people merely voting is
not all that much higher. According to a report by the Committee for the Study of the American
Electorate, 19% of those old enough to vote actually did so in the 1990 primary elections. San Diego
Union, Oct. 4, 1990, at A25, col. 1 (city ed.). In California, the turnout has been somewhat higher.
31.92% of state residents eligible to vote did so in the 1988 primary elections, and 53.51% did so in
the 1988 general election. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE Nov. 8,1988 AND STATEMENT
OF VOTE, June 7, 1988.
49. It can be argued however, that the protests of a single individual may not realistically
represent the interests of "the people," and may simply represent one person's idiosyncratic views
which should actually be discounted by an administrative body representing "the people." See
Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jwr&nrudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SuP. Cr.
[Vol. 27
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II. GUIDELINES FOR ANALYSIS
An understanding of the complex nature of the SLAPP problem leads to the
realization that it cannot be solved by any simple legal solution.50 Solving the
SLAPP problem requires bringing all the powers of the legal process to bear.
To properly design the sophisticated solution necessary to remedy the problem,
clear objectives must be established. Additionally, there are limitations that
must be observed to prevent the solution from becoming a problem in itself.
These objectives and limitations establish guidelines which can be used to
evaluate currently existing responses to abuses of the legal system as applied to
SLAPPs as well as in evaluating and enhancing proposed solutions.
A Objectives for Eliminating SLAPPs
Ideally, a solution to the problem of SLAPPs would address and nullify the
motives for filing SLAPPs.5 1 This would strike at the true cause of the problem
rather than at the symptoms. Unfortunately, this probably cannot be achieved.
Few legal responses can directly change the motivation for behavior. What the
law can do, however, is address and limit actions prompted by that motivation.
In the case of SLAPPs, this can be done by rendering SLAPPs ineffective, which,
while not nullifying the motives for filing SLAPPs, would make the actual filing
pointless.
To render SLAPPs ineffective, a solution must be designed that not only
neutralizes the adverse effects of these suits,52 but also eliminates the incentives
that facilitate the filing of these suits. These adverse effects and incentives are
embodied in five interrelated and overlapping objectives that must be achieved
to produce an effective and lasting solution to the problem of SLAPPs.
Achieving these objectives would render SLAPPs ineffective.
1. Protect defendants from economic costs. The defendants in these suits are
parties who, regardless of their motives, have committed no legally recognized
wrong because they are exercising their constitutional right to petition the
government. 3 To protect these defendants, the solution must eliminate the
economic hardship borne by SLAPP defendants-specifically, the cost of a legal
defense. Currently, SLAPPs allow the plaintiffs to take advantage of their
superior economic assets to hire attorneys and inundate the defendants with
REv. 341, 397.
50. Abrams, supra note 28, at 41.
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
53. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
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discovery and pretrial motions.- Without economic protection, the cost of a
defense alone may compel SLAPP defendants to settle.
2 Reduce the "chilling effect" of SLAPPs. In the SLAPP scenario, a suit
against one activist citizen reduces the odds that other citizens will become
activists. This "chilling effect"55 can theoretically ripple through a community,
reducing public participation, and in turn, reducing the effectiveness of our
representational form of government. The "chilling effect" is therefore the most
insidious and perhaps the most damaging aspect of SLAPPs.
Several factors combine to create the "chilling effect."56 First, there is the
reasonable fear that due to the real possibility of erroneous judgments, a person
may be punished for otherwise lawful conduct. The availability of appellate
review does nothing to help relieve this chilling effect because an appeal simply
extends the litigation. Further complicating this problem is the uncertainty lay
people face as they consider the legality of their petitioning activities in light of
highly complex tort laws. 7 Finally, even if there is no possibility of error and
the defendant is certain that the petitioning was legal, the cost of defending a
suit prompted by petitioning would still be prohibitive.
The "chilling effect" may be reduced in several ways. The possibility for error
could be minimized by requiring more specificity in SLAPP pleadings. Citizen
uncertainty could be reduced by broadening the protections provided for people
engaged in first amendment activities by shifting heavier burdens to the
plaintiff.58 Even the "chilling effect" caused by the costs to the defending party
can be reduced by awarding attorney's fees to SLAPP defendants.
Of course, as long as our legal system remains flexible and adaptive in
recognizing and redressing injuries, it will remain open to some abuse. And, as
54. "Ihe liberal discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offer opportunities for
harassment, abuse, and vexatious imposition of expense that can make the mere pendency of a
complex lawsuit so burdensome to defendants as to force them to buy their peace regardless of the
merits of the case." Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), cerat denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977)).
55. "A chilling effect occurs when individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by the first
amendment are deterred from doing so by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that
protected activity." Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58
B.U.L. REv. 685, 693 (1978) (emphasis omitted). Thus, the chilling effect arises in SLAPPs through
the plaintiff's ability to use tort law to deter the defendant from continuing to petition and to deter
others from joining the petitioning activity.
56. See id. for a detailed free speech analysis of these factors and the "chilling effect" doctrine.
57. For example, defamation, a common SLAPP claim, has only four legal elements
(defamatory message, publication, causation, and damages), yet an explanation of the tort and its
defenses takes up over 300 pages in Corpus Juris Secundum. 53 CJ.S. Libel and Slander §§ 1-216
(1987 & Supp. 1990).
58. "'The chilling effect doctrine reflects the view that the harm caused by the chilling of free
speech (or other protected activity) is comparatively greater than the harm resulting from the chilling
of the other activities involved. And, the logical and necessary mandate of the chilling effect doctrine
is that legal rules be formulated so as to allocate the risk of error away from the preferred value,
thereby minimizing the occurrence of those errors which we deem the most harmful." Schauer, supra
note 55, at 705.
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long as defendants remain subject to erroneous judgments, there will always be
some risk to petitioning citizens, and hence, some "chilling effect."s 9 Despite
these realities, the legislatures and the courts must do everything possible to
limit the negative side effects of petitioning government.
3. Resolve SLAPPs expeditiously. The solution must not only discourage
SLAPPs in the first place but also must require early identificatione ° and
expeditious handling of them when they are filed.6' This is necessary to both
reduce the burden on the courts and allow the defendant to return to his or her
petitioning activity.62
The courts experience increased burdens because SLAPPs, in addition to their
uniquely damaging impact on constitutional rights, possess the same the effects
of ordinary frivolous suits. As a result, the "court system itself becomes more
clogged, disrupted, and delayed, thus affecting the taxpayers in general, and other
litigants who have their suits delayed."63 Only expeditious dispute resolution
can reduce this burden once suits are brought.
The solution must be expeditious to minimize the effect of the lawsuit on
defendant's petitioning activity. One major purpose of a SLAPP is to distract
the defendant from the petitioning activity. SLAPPs take their toll on individual
defendants through the prolonged emotional and physical effects of being
involved in a lawsuit." Organizations lose members and revenues.65 Further,
SLAPPs delay resolution of the issues which prompted the petitioning. This
delay may well render the goal of the petitioning moot and allow the plaintiff to
59. Schauer, supra note 55, at 700.
60. "An 'ideal' justice solution would set a precedent for early identification and dismissal of
true intimidation suits and procedural and liability disincentives to discourage their filing." Pring,
Intimidation Suits Against Citizens: A Risk for Public Policy Advocates, Nat'l L.J., July 22, 1985, at 16,
cols. 1-3 (litigation sec.).
61. "In the preservation of the free exercise of speech, writing and the political function, the
early termination of [the] lawsuit is highly desirable. We should discourage attempts to recover
through the judicial process what has been lost in the political process." Okun v. Superior Court,
29 Cal. 3d 442, 461, 175 Cal. Rptr. 157, 169, 629 P.2d 1369, 1381 (1981) (Mosk, J. dissenting), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981).
62. While expeditious handling of these suits reduces the pecuniary costs of litigation borne
by the defendant, one of the goals of an effective solution is to eliminate these costs completely.
63. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study Of Tort Liability And Procedural Sanctions, 14
HOFSrRA L. REv. 433 (1986).
64. One SLAPP defendant described the extent of this distraction:
I became so preoccupied by the suit that it changed my whole focus and direction in
life. I got appraisals on the house and thought of moving to Oregon. I'm like most
Americans: My assets are in my home. This case was an overhanging cloud. Even
though you may prevail, you'll spend a ton of money fighting it. You can win and still
lose. I didn't function well at work because I was trying to figure out how I was going
to protect my family. The president [of the firm I worked for] called me in one day
and said my performance wasn't satisfactory and asked me for my resignation. If I
didn't resign, I'd get fired the next day. I resigned.
Boyle, Activists at Risk of Being SLAPPed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 25, 1991, at 6, 8.
65. Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First Amendment, 7 PAcE ENvILt L. Re3v. 45,53 (1989).
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accomplish his or her goal of disrupting petitioning efforts." Since SLAPPs
distract the defendants from their original goals, winning the lawsuit would be
like winning the battle only to lose the war.
4. Discourage attorneys from filing SLAPPs. An effective solution for SLAPPs
would eliminate these suits from an attorney's consideration. The low
probability of success in and out of court, and the legal and economic ramifica-
tions on clients, should discourage attorneys from pursuing these claims.
However, the impact on the client has only an indirect effect on the attorney.
Therefore, penalties should be devised (through the form of disciplinary
proceedings or monetary sanctions) which directly affects the attorney and
effectively discourages these suits. Since attorneys would neither wish to risk
these penalties nor lose their clients to less scrupulous lawyers, they will be
forced to find legitimate, alternative means of resolving the dispute between the
client and the petitioning citizens.
5. Eliminate the economic incentives to file a SLAPP. The most important
objective of a solution would be to make filing a SLAPP suit economically
undesirable. This would mean eliminating the possibility of economic gain
obtained by silencing the opposition. As previously pointed out,67 business
entities initiate the vast majority of SLAPPs. This is done as part of an economi-
cally driven strategy and will continue to be done as long as SLAPPs are an
effective business strategy. There are presently economic incentives to filing
SLAPPs because the cost of suing a petitioner is significantly less than "the cost
of allowing the petitioning to continue unchecked. 68 It follows then that the
most effective way of eliminating these suits is to make them economically
infeasible. This disincentive alone may have the most effect in reducing the
number of SLAPPs.69 Practically, the only way to eliminate this prospective
gain is to seriously penalize the party filing the SLAPP in a manner commensu-
rate with what that party hoped to gain through the intimidation."
In summary, all of these objectives must be achieved to eliminate SLAPPs by
rendering them ineffective. To do so, the solution must be proactive rather than
66. Pell, supra note 39, at 44.
67. See supra note 19.
68. The national estimate of plaintiff's legal fees and expenses for tort cases is between $7,300
and $8,800. J. KAKAtJK & N. PACE, supra note 35, at 42. The average claim for damages in SLAPP
cases is $9 million. See supra note 33.
69. Realistically, some plaintiffs file SLAPPs without regard to economic interests and are
merely interested in a form of public vindication or retribution. These SLAPPs will probably never
be stopped unless attorneys refuse to bring them.
70. The actual considerations that should be used are similar to those used in determining the
award of any sanction. However, the calculation should start at a figure near the plaintiffs claim for
damages as a type of SLAPP "lodestar" value. For example, if the plaintiff claims damages of $1
million dollars in lost profits, only a sanction based at $1 million dollars (and then adjusted based on
the plaintiffs ability to pay, the nature of the petitioning activity, and the facts of the particular case)
will have the desired effect of making the economic risk of bringing the suit greater than the risk of
dealing with the petitioners in the political forum.
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reactive. True success will be achieved only when the plaintiff refrains from
filing the SLAPP in the first place. The solution must create a chasm for the
plaintiff to leap. If the plaintiff's claims are meritorious, he will land safely on
the other side where legitimate litigation can begin. If not, he will fall into the
chasm and suffer great penalties. This chasm will produce an economic leap of
faith. Those plaintiffs with meritorious claims will safely jump, and those
without will not even try.
B. Limitations To Observe In Forming A Solution
To attain the objectives outlined above, several limitations must be recognized
and addressed to prevent the solution from becoming as damaging as the
problem it is trying to solve. The four limitations that must be considered when
creating a solution to the problem of SLAPPs center around the common theme
of distinguishing legitimate lawsuits from SLAPPs. They are raised here as part
of the guidelines for analysis.7'
1. Avoid reactionary responses to SLAPP-like suits. The solution to SLAPPs
must be expedient and quick, but must not trigger a judicial knee-jerk reaction.
The solution must avoid impinging on the rights of legitimate plaintiffs whose
lawsuits have, at first glance, the characteristics of a SLAPP. At times,
defendants will exceed the bounds of legal p.etitioning, and the plaintiff's
grievance will be legitimate.72 As noted earlier, it is often difficult to identify
a SLAPP because the complaint describes the petitioning activity in terms of
recognized torts. Not only is it difficult to distinguish a SLAPP from a
legitimate suit, but also it is possible that legitimate suits will be classified
mistakenly as SLAPPs.
2 Overcome the scarcity offacts in pleadings. There is often a distinct absence
or distortion of facts in the complaint that makes distinguishing between a
SLAPP and a non-SLAPP difficult.74 This is particularly true in notice pleading
jurisdictions such as federal courts and state courts that model their civil
procedure rules after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP). 7
Without the benefit of discovery and the presentation of evidence to a trier of
fact, determining whether the suit is a SLAPP or not may be impossible under
71. The methods by which these limitations may be observed are discussed in the context of
the proposed solutions. See infra Section IV.
72. See Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 1982) (boycotts which are intentionally designed
to injure the plaintiffs and force them to join defendant's other, legitimate, petitioning activity are not
protected by the petition clause, although incidental injury would be protected).
73. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). "A pleading whi[h sets forth a claim for relief.., shall contain (1)
a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends,... (2) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for
judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Id. (emphasis added).
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normal notice pleading. Since it is a goal of any SLAPP solution to resolve the
suit quickly without a full trial, the solution must provide a means for allowing
a trier of fact to quickly determine the true factual issues underlying the
complaint.
3. Prevent abuse of the solution. The solution to SLAPPs must not be prone
to abuse and must incorporate penalties for abuse when it does occur. In the
SLAPP scenario, the form of abuse most likely to occur is petitioning of the
government in an attempt to conceal and obtain first amendment protection for
actual tortious conduct. Such abuse is the foreseeable result of granting absolute
immunity for acts associated with the petitioning of government. 76 Because of
the need to balance first amendment freedoms with restraints on actual tortious
conduct77 no change should be made by any SLAPP solution to the extent of
first amendment protection s  Ample protection for legitimate SLAPP
defendants already exists under the first amendment. The solution to SLAPPs
must simply bring this forth.
4. Stay within constitutional limits. The solution to SLAPPs must remain
within the bounds of the Constitution of the United States. To do so it must
not deny plaintiffs due process of law.79 Though quick processing of the case
is necessary, the process must not be so summary as to deny plaintiff's fourteenth
amendment rights. A party must have an opportunity to be heard and to enforce
his or her rights before the court.ss
76. The first amendment has not been interpreted to give absolute immunity for petitioning
or free speech. Schauer, supra note 55, at 712-14, argues that the Supreme Court is willing to accept
some chilling of protected activity as part of a balancing of interests. See also McDonald v. Smith,
472 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding that the petition clause does not provide absolute immunity from
liability for libel), affg 737 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1984), aff'g 562 F. Supp. 829 (M.D.N.C. 1983)
(expressly rejecting the absolute immunity under the petition clause afforded the defendant by the
majority in Webb, 167 NV. Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28). See also Protect our Mountain Environment, 677
P.2d at 1366 ('the First Amendment does not grant a license to use the courts for improper
purposes.!). See infra note 183.
77. 'The effective exercise of first amendment rights requires immunity from liability for good
faith and negligent false statements, but there must be some protection against the deliberate lie.
Some balance must be struck which allows the one to proceed uninhibited while also punishing those
who hide irresponsible and malicious actions behind the guise of first amendment freedom." Webb,
167 NV. Va. at 468, 282 S.E.2d at 47-48 (Neely, J., dissenting). See infra note 183.
78. The difference between the definition of a SLAPP as used in this Comment and the
definition established by Canan and Pring may also explain why Pring seems to espouse an absolute
immunity for SLAPP defendants based on their petitioning. Pring, supra note 4, at 15 & 19. When
"SLAPP defendants" are defined as only those people acting in the public interest, it is relatively safe
(from a moral, if not legal viewpoint) to give them absolute immunity for their petitioning. However,
when SLAPP defendants include those involved in more self-interested petitioning, more scrutiny of
the petitioning itself is necessary. This scrutiny does not examine whether the petitioning is of public
or private concern, rather it examines whether the petitioning is genuine or merely a "sham" intended
to conceal actual tortious conduct. See infra note 183.
79. See Stein, supra note 65, at 48. "Our challenge, as law yers, law professors, and citizens
concerned about the SLAPP suit epidemic is to devise remedies which do not themselves imperil the
constitutional and legal rights of others. To appeal to the courts for a remedy is, we must not forget,
a most elemental demonstration of the right to petition." Id
80. Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 45 Ill. 2d 405, 259 N.E.2d 282 (1990).
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III. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING LEoAL RESPONSES
An analysis of existing responses to SLAPPs, undertaken in terms of the
objectives and limitations described above, reveals that these responses will have
little practical effect in reducing the filing of SLAPPs. Much of the problem
stems from the reactive nature of the responses currently available. Existing
responses can reduce the harm, but often their effect comes too late, usually
after the plaintiffs goal has been achieved. This failure is apparent from
comparing the increasing number of these suits filed with the few number of
these suits in which the plaintiff prevails.81
A Specific Defenses On The Merits
The normal method of defense in a lawsuit is a defense on the merits of the
claims. This means that during the course of a civil trial, the SLAPP defendant
must refute the legal elements of the plaintiff's claims and also attempt to prove
all available affirmative defenses. This response is often effective,8a but only to
protect the defendant from the plaintiffs claims. It fails to protect the defendant
from the real evils of SLAPPs. This response does not protect the defendant
from the economic costs of paying an attorney and court costs. It subjects the
defendant to the risks inherent in our legal system while doing nothing to
address the chilling effect of these suits. A defense on the merits is not
expeditious because it requires the long delays and emotional strain associated
with litigating a civil case. It also does nothing to discourage attorneys from
bringing these suits. Most important, this defense does not address the plaintiffs
economic incentive to file a SLAPP. The result is that a specific defense on the
merits is the worst solution to this problem.
B. The Petition Clause Constitutional Defense
Typically, the most sweeping defense available is an invocation of the first
amendment right to petition government. This defense is raised in the form of
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.u This doctrine immunizes parties undertaking
legitimate petitioning of the government from any civil cause of action by a third
81. "[O]ver 77% of SLAPPs are ultimately won by [defendants]." Pring, supra note 4, at 12.
In the earlier Canan and Pring study of 100 SLAPPs, 68% of the cases were dismissed in favor of the
targets and final legal judgments favored targets in 83% of the cases. Canan & Pring 2, supra note
4, at 514.
82. Brecher, supra note 34, at 123-31. Brecher at length discusses defenses to particular causes
of action such as malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, and conspiracy. He concludes
that these defenses may work but "the cost is apt to be high" Id. at 131.
83. The doctrine has evolved primarily from three cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972). For applications of the petition clause in SLAPP suits, see Webb, 167 W. Va. 434,
282 S.E.2d 28; Weatfield Partners, 740 F. Supp. 523.
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party injured by the petitioning action.M The only exception, the sham
exception, applies when the defendant's activity is found to be a disguised
attempt to actually injure the plaintiff, rather than a true attempt to petition the
government. s Thus, the first amendment petition clause privilege is only a
qualified privilege.8
This constitutional defense alone, while almost guaranteed to win the lawsuit
for the defendant,7 fails as a solution to SLAPPs because it is a reactive
solution to the problem and takes effect too late. It has all the drawbacks of
the specific defenses discussed above.89 It is important to note, however, that
under basic constitutional doctrine, petitioning activity is specially protected.90
This special protection is a critical basis upon which the solutions proposed later
in this Comment are formulated.9'
C. Procedural Defenses
Procedural law provides a variety of defensive responses to SLAPP-like suits.
Unfortunately, these procedural defenses fail as solutions to SLAPPs. In federal
courts, for example, FRCP 12(b)(6), provides for a dismissal of a suit for failure
to state a claim.92 In the SLAPP scenario, this motion is useless because it is
relatively easy for the plaintiff to frame the defendant's petitioning action in
terms of legitimate tort claims. It is only during the trial that the petitioning
action is revealed and the identity of the suit as a SLAPP becomes clear.9
84. See generally Comment, Protecting The First Amendment Right to Petition: Immunity for
Defendants in Defamation Actions Through the Application of the Noerr-Pennington Doctidne, 31 AM.
U.L REv. 147 (1981).
85. See id.
86. It is important to note that this privilege is based on the defendant's intent in acting.
Malicious intent, which is unprotected, must be distinguished from the protection granted a genuine
Intent to petition the government, which is done for a private rather than public interest. See infra
note 183.
87. The Canan and Pring study of 228 SLAPPs showed that "the chances of a defendant
winning a SLAPP suit substantially improved (from 67% to 82%) if the petition clause had been
raised as a defense." Canan, supra note 4, at 26. The initial study of 100 SLAPPs had shown an
Increase from 57% to 92% when the petition clause was raised. Canan & Pring 2, supra note 4, at
514.
88. Stein, supra note 65, at 55. "[V]irtually always, the SLAPP plaintiff has no desire to allow
the litigation to proceed to the point where Noerr-Pennington, or any other speech and petition-
protectionist doctrine can be applied." Id.
89. See supra Section III.A.
90. The "state action" doctrine does not limit the use of first amendment rights (as
incorporated through the fourteenth amendment) as a defense to civil suits between private parties.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("The test is not the form in which state
power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been erercised.").
Id
91. See infra Section IV.
92. FED. R. CiV. P. 12(b)(6).
93. One attempt to modify a state law motion to dismiss to provide a solution to SLAPPs was
created by the court in Protect Our Mountain Environment, 677 P.2d 1361. Under this system a
defendant's motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds of a right to petition would require the court
to give the parties a reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to the motion. The court
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol27/iss2/8
ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTION TO SLAPP SuTs
Other procedural remedies, such as motions for summary judgment are also
limited in their utility.94 Such motions do not protect the defendant economi-
cally from the costs of the discovery process. They do not result in a quick
resolution of the dispute because of the considerable time involved in pre-trial
practice and discovery. Most importantly, all available procedural defenses fail
to reduce the plaintiff's economic incentive to file a SLAPP.95
D. Awarding Attorney's Fees
Awarding attorney fees to the defendant could be a practical and potentially
effective method for curtailing most mere nuisance suits because it forces the
plaintiff to weigh the probability of achieving success against the cost of
failure.9 Unfortunately, there are significant limitations on the effectiveness
of awarding attorney's fees as a solution to SLAPPs. First, the American rule
generally denies attorney's fees for the prevailing party' in the absence of
applicable statutory provisions.9 Second, there is an inherent difficulty in
qualifying for attorney's fees even under existing statutory exceptions to the
American rule.99 To illustrate this difficulty, Brecher analyzes California Code
would then treat the motion as one for summary judgment. This motion would be resolved under a
new heightened standard established by the court. This heightened standard places the burden on the
plaintiff to make a showing sufficient to allow the court to reasonably conclude that the defendant's
petitioning actions were not protected by the first amendment because: "(1) the defendant's
administrative or judicial claims were devoid of reasonable factual support... ; and (2) the primary
purpose of the defendant's petitioning activity was to harass the plaintiff or to effectuate some other
improper objective; and (3) the defendant's petitioning activity had the capacity to adversely affect
a legal interest of the plaintiff." ME at 1369. This approach is supported by some legal writers. See
Pring, supra note 4, at 18; Abrams, supra note 28, at 42. Unfortunately, this is a limited response to
SLAPPs and fails to meet all the objectives of a successful solution, especially that of reducing the
economic incentive to SLAPP and protecting the defendant from economic costs. Losing a summary
judgment has no deterrent effect and a requirement that the parties present all pertinent material
does little to reduce the costs to the defendants of having an attorney go through discovery. See supra
Section II.A. For further discussion of the problems with the solution suggested in Protect Our
Mountain Environment, see Sive, supra note 43, at 27, col. 2.
94. This is true particularly in federal court because it easy to establish a factual controversy
regarding a defendant's motivation. Brecher, supra note 34, at 121.
95. These procedural defenses fail even when accompanied by requests for sanctions. See infra
Section III.E.
96. For a detailed analysis of the economic factors motivating and facilitating nuisance suits
and the theoretically demonstrable elimination of economic incentive (in nuisance suits) through
awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party, see Rosenberg & Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are
Brought For Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. oF L & ECON. 3 (1985).
97. Alyeska Pipeline Service, Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (the American
rule provides that each party shall bear its own fees unless the other side acts in bad faith).
98. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980) (stating that under certain circumstances "the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs.").
99. Brecher, supra note 34, at 132-36. But see Westfield Partner, 744 F. Supp. 189, where the
court granted defendants attorney's fees of $9,258.60 under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and sanctioned the
plaintiff's counsel under FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
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of Civil Procedure section 1021.5,1°° a statute which allows an award of
attorney's fees in public interest cases. Brecher notes that one element of the
statute, whether "the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are
such as to make the award appropriate,"01 presents a formidable obstacle to
the party seeking fees.1u2 This obstacle arises when a prevailing defendant is
likely to be found to have a personal need to defend the suit, rather than a
public purpose, and that any public benefit is purely coincidental1es Aomrding
to the Brecher analysis, absent a finding of an important public interest, SLAPP
defendants will not be allowed attorney's fees.
Finally, and most importantly, the SLAPP plaintiff may view the prospect of
paying defendant's attorney's fees as an insignificant risk relative to the potential
losses that will occur if the petitioning activity is left unchecked. Though the
average claim for damages in SLAPPs is $9 million,"°4 the average for defen-
dant's legal costs paid per claim is approximately $8,500 for tort litigation
terminated in state and federal courts of general jurisdiction.es Even assuming
that the plaintiff's actual damages due to the defendant's petitioning action are
only a fraction of those claimed, the economic incentive to sue vastly outweighs
the costs of suing and paying attorney's fees.'06 This is true because the
probability of success for the plaintiff is independent of the outcome of the
lawsuit. Simply bringing the suit will probably have the desired effect of
distracting the defendant and eliminating the petitioning.1 7  Not only are
attorney's fees too difficult to obtain, but also under existing law they provide
little economic deterrent to a plaintiff inclined to file a SLAPP.
100. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980). 'Upon motion, a court may award attorneys'
fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in
the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether
pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b)
the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate,
and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any... ." Id
(emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Brecher, supra note 34, at 133.
103. Id. at 134.
104. See supra note 33.
105. J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, supra note 35, at 58. This figure represents cases, other than those
involving motor vehicles, terminated nationwide in 1985. This figure is significantly lower, $5,400 to
$6,600, when auto torts (torts involving vehicular accidents) are included. See id. However, non-
statistical data suggests that the costs of defending SLAPPs may be significantly higher (or perhaps
only the more sensational figures are published as "newsworthy). These amounts reported include:
$25,000 in legal defense fees (Galperin, Getting Slapped, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 1990, at Ki, col. 4.);
$35,000 (Gest, A Chilling Flurry of Lawsuits, U.S. Naws & WoRLD REPORT, May 23, 1988, at 64);
$22,000 (Intimidation, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 24, 1990, at A18 (editorial)); $75,000 and
$350,000 (Lockyer Bill Report, infra note 170).
106. In WestfieldPartners, 744 F. Supp. 189, the court awarded less than $10,000 in attorney's
fees to the defendants while the plaintiff claimed $3 million in compensatory damages. If the plaintiff
really suffered such large damages, spending $10,000 more as part of an effort to recoup damages is
an economically necessary action.
107. Compare the SLAPP plaintiff's indifference to both attorney's fees and obtaining a
favorable judgment with the economic incentive vel non to sue if the plaintiff's success depended on
the outcome of the lawsuit itself. See generally Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 96.
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E. Imposition Of Sanctions On Lawyers And Clients
With the use of sanctions,1'8 the courts can achieve some measure of success
in rendering SLAPPs economically ineffective for the plaintiff. This power is
available to the courts through statutory provisions such as FRCP 11,109
through various state rules such as California Civil Procedure Rule 128.5,1
and also through the court's inherent power to control the litigation before
it.' In order to have the desired effect, the courts must order sanctions that
are commensurate with the plaintiffs potential loss from the petitioning activity.
This is within the power of the courts.lu For example, if the plaintiff will not
achieve his or her projected earnings from a potential project if the petitioning
activity is successful, the plaintiff could fie a SLAPP. If the SLAPP succeeds in
eliminating the defendant's petitioning activity (momentarily ignoring the
outcome in court), the plaintiff can go ahead with his or her plans and achieve
the projected earnings. If the plaintiff wins in court, which is statistically
unlikely,1 3 the damages awarded are a windfall. If the plaintiff loses, the
plaintiffs own attorney's fees are the cost of protecting the future earnings. In
contrast, if the court actually applied sanctions to the plaintiff equal to the
projected earnings, then the plaintiff will effectively earn nothing and suffer a net
loss after paying his or her attorney. Consequently, using sanctions to neutralize
the potential profits earned if the defendant's ability to petition is destroyed will
108. Often there is an overlap between the award of attorney's fees and the award of sanctions.
However, "the primary purpose of sanctions is to deter attorney and litigant misconduct, not to
compensate the opposing party for its costs in defending a frivolous suit." White v. General Motors
Corp., Inc., 908 F.2d 675, 684 (10th Cir. 1990).
109. -FD. R. Civ. P. 11 provides: 'Every pleading, motion and other paper... shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record.... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate
by the signer that the signer has read the pleading,.. ; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry.., that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
... If a pleading ... is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction...." rI
110. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE. § 128.5 (West Supp. 1990). 'Every trial court may order a party,
the party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by
another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay." Id. § 128.5(a).
111. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990)(affirming the use of a District Court's inherent powers to impose sanctions of one million dollars and
disbar some of the parties' attorneys), cer. granted sub nom., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
38 (1990).
112. "The decision of what constitutes an appropriate sanction rests within the sound discretion
of the district court. However, the amount of the sanction must be a carefully measured response
to the sanctioned conduct... " Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C & 0 Enter., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485,1496 (7th Cir.
1989) (citations omitted). "Rule 11 sanctions are meant to serve several purposes, including (1)
deterringfiture litigation abuse, (2) punishing present litigation abuse, (3) compensating victims of
litigation abuse, and (4) streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management." Whit4 908
F.2d at 683 (emphasis added). "[Tjhe central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in [the]
District Court... ." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990).
113. See supra notes 81 & 87.
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effectively eliminate the economic incentive to fie a SLAPP.
In practice, however, sanctions fall short of their potential because they are
difficult to impose, and even if imposed, they are usually granted in nominal
amounts.114 This result occurs because of the court's fear of deterring attorneys
from pursuing the remedies available to their clients.1'
Sanctions can also be levied jointly against lawyers and their SLAPP
plaintiffs.116 Though this may advance the goal of limiting attorney involve-
ment, it may reduce the economic disincentive to the plaintiff if the plaintiff and
attorney share in the payment of the sanctions." 7
Because of their practical failure to eliminate the economic incentive to file
SLAPPs, as well as their failure to resolve the dispute expeditiously, sanctions
alone do not provide a solution to SLAPPs.
F. Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings
The fMling of SLAPPs should, theoretically, already be limited by the stalte rules
of professional conduct governing attorney behavior."8 State rules of profes-
sional conduct, most of which are adoptions of the American Bar Association
models," 9 prevent attorneys from bringing claims which are not meritori-
ous." o Though the exact definition of a meritorious claim is broad and open
114. Brecher, supra note 34, at 137. See also White, 908 F.2d at 684-85. The circumstances to
consider when determining monetary sanctions are: (1) reasonableness (lodestar) calculation; (2)
minimum to deter, (3) ability to pay; and (4) other factors. These circumstances all serve as
limitations on the amount assessed. Id.
115. "In imposing sanctions, we are well aware of the strong public policy in favor of the
peaceful resolution of disputes in our courts and that attorneys must not be deterred from pursing
their client's remedies for fear of sanctions against them and/or their clients." Maple Properties v.
Harris, 158 Cal. App. 3d 997,1010,205 Cal. Rptr. 532,541 (1984), cert deied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1984).
See also JUDICIAL RESPONSES, supra note 45, at IV.4.
116. FFD. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note 109. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a), supra note 110.
117. Paying nominal sanctions, even those imposed on their attorneys, may simply be "part of
the cost of doing business" for SLAPP plaintiffs. Stein, supra note 65, at 58.
118. But see Brooks, supra note 11, at 66-74, arguing that a SLAPP solution needs to "weigh the
basic moral value of the lawsuit in the specific case," something which cannot be done with the flawed
ethical standards such as those adopted by the legal profession. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).
119. ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr § 61:103 (1990).
120. MODEL CODE OF PROFEssiONAL RESPONSIBmnrrY DR 2-109(A) (1981) ('A lawyer shall not
accept employment on behalf of a person if he knows or it is obvious that such person wishes to: (1)
Bring a legal action, conduct a defense, or assert a position in litigation, or otherwise have steps taken
for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person. (2) Present a claim
or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.'); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1989) 'A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.'). See also
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-200(A) (1988) ('A member shall not seek,
accept, or continue employment if the member knows or should know that the objective of such
employment is: (A) To bring an action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take an
appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person;
or (B) To present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it
can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of such existing
[Vrol. 27
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to some interpretation, m1 the intent of the rules clearly is to prevent abuse of
the legal process and to prevent suits from being brought primarily to harass or
maliciously injure a personY2 As shown above m the motives for filing
SLAPPs include retaliation and intimidation. Suits filed for such purposes are
plainly prohibited by the rules. Ideally then, under the existing rules of
professional conduct, attorneys, subject to disciplinary proceedings for filing
SLAPPs, should be discouraged from fling them, thus achieving an important
objective in solving the problem of SLAPPs.m4 Unfortunately, this does not
appear to be the case.
The rules of professional conduct have had a limited effect in curbing SLAPPs.
There are several reasons for this.125 First, the mere threat of a SLAPP suit
is unlikely to prompt a citizen complaint to a state bar disciplinary committee,
and even if reported, a threat is sufficiently inchoate that no action could be
reasonably taken. Second, even after the suit is brought, few lay defendants have
either the knowledge or the objectivity to distinguish a frivolous claim from a
legitimate claim. Third, the deceptive nature of the SLAPP complaint'm may
prevent judges and defendant's attorneys from recognizing the SLAPP as
frivolous, which prevents them from reporting it. Finally, despite the duty
imposed upon them to report,12' there appears to be a general reluctance on
the part of attorneys and judges to report filings of a frivolous suitsM78 and an
accompanying lack of enforcement by the bar.m
law.').
121. See ABA/BNA LAwYERs' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr § 61.101, Trial Conduct,
Meritorious Claims (1988). See also Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation
and Enforcement, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 939 (noting that the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility has serious interpretation problems and the Model Rules are little better).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 comment (1989).
123. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
124. See supra Section II.A4.
125. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss the degree, and the cause, of the bar's
failure to regulate itself through disciplinary rules and procedures. See generally Marks & Cathcart,
Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is it Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL L. F. 193.
126. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
127. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.D.(2) (1990) ('A judge who receives
information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct should take appropriate action."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONSInILrIT DR 1-103 (1981) ("A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR
1-102 shall report such knowledge... "); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIrrY DR 1-
102(A) (1981) ('A lawyer shall not: (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule."); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1990) ("A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.").
128. See generally Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491 (attributing this failure
to report in part to society's ambivalence toward informing). See also Note, Reporting Peer
Misconduct" Lip Service to Ethical Standards is Not Enough, 31 ARIz. L REv. 657, 662-64 (1989),
which attributes nonreporting of lawyer violations to the vague and uncertain wording of the rules
themselves.
129. See Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the
Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL L REv. 977, 979-82.
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The result is that the rules of professional conduct as currently enforced fail
to reduce the filing of SLAPPs despite their potential to do so. Even if
enforced, the rules of professional conduct alone can only satisfy one of the five
objectives required for a successful solution to SLAPPs. However, since the
observance of these rules could significantly reduce the filing of SLAPPs, they
are an important part of the proposed solutions to SLAPPs discussed later in
this Comment. 0
G. Countersuits (SLAPP-Backs")
One often recommended response to SLAPPs are countersuits filed by SLAPP
defendants against the SLAPP plaintiffs, commonly called "SLAPP-Backs."1t
These countersuits may be based on several legal grounds including state and
federal constitutional rights, state and federal civil right statutes, abuse of
process, and malicious prosecution .132 A large award of damages to SLAPP-
Back plaintiffs (former SLAPP defendants) could cause substantial economic
harm to the former SLAPP plaintiff, eliminating any possible gain obtained
through the SLAPP. A SLAPP-Back thus reduces the economic incentive to
SLAPP.
There are however, many shortcomings to this type of response. All SLAPP-
Backs, regardless of their underlying cause of action, extend the already
protracted litigation1 and leave the defendant embroiled in litigation he or
she never anticipated. Further, unless and until the SLAPP-Back is resolved in
the SLAPP defendant's favor, SLAPP-Backs do little to reduce the economic
harm the SLAPP defendant suffered in the original SLAPP. Finally, the
individual causes of action for SLAPP-Backs each have problems which limit
their effectiveness. A brief examination of the malicious prosecution cause of
action is illustrative.
As currently implemented, a malicious prosecution suit is a poor choice for
reducing the filing of SLAPPs. These suits cannot be brought until the SLAPP
is settled on the merits in favor of the defendant."m Additionally, malicious
prosecution suits are disfavored by the courts and difficult to successfully
pursue."35 Admittedly, measures could be taken to remedy some of these
130. See infra Section IV.
131. Pring, supra note 4, at 19.
132. Md at 20.
133. See supra note 36.
134. A complaint for malicious prosecution must allege malice, lack of probable cause, and a
favorable termination of the prior proceedings. Scannell v. County of Riverside, 152 Cal. App. 3d
596, 611, 199 Cal. Rptr. 644, 652 (1984). A cause of action for malicious prosecution accrues at the
time of entry of judgment of the underlying action. Id. at 616, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 655. Therefore, a
SLAPP that is pursued through discovery and pretrial practice, no matter how much hardship it
produces for the defendant, is not grounds for a malicious prosecution suit.
135. See Wade, supra note 63, at 437-39. 'The courts have placed stringent restrictions upon this
tort action. In some states, the restrictions are so stringent as to render the cause of action essentially
unavailable." Id. at 438. See also Brecher, supra note 34, at 125.
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problems.
In his article, Joseph Brecher argues that the traditional laws for when a claim
of malicious prosecution can be brought should be modified to allow immediate
cross-claims for malicious prosecution.'1 This could reduce the total amount
of time spent in litigation if the suit and malicious prosecution action were
litigated consecutively. His analysis refutes the traditional arguments against
these malicious prosecution cross-claims, including the argument of not having
a true cause of action until the original suit is finally adjudicated in the
defendant's favor.? 7 He points out that the real difficulty lies in deciding when
to allow these claims.
Brecher recommends inquiring into whether the defendant acted in the public
interest based on the factors set out in California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5 for awarding attorney's fees in public interest cases. M He
proposes that a plaintiff (a former SLAPP defendant) meeting the section 1021.5
test should be allowed to bring an immediate malicious prosecution cross-claim.
Unfortunately, there are two basic weaknesses in this proposal. The first
weakness is that it only works for targets acting in the public interest.19
Though most SLAPP defendants probably represent (informally) their
communities in an action, there is no reason to believe that they all do so in
each case. Petitioning a zoning board to deny a variance because it will affect
the property value of one's home or to avoid increased traffic and congestion in
one's neighborhood is just as valid as petitioning to save the scenic beauty of the
surrounding hillsides. Under the section 1021.5 test, however, the first reason
probably would be insufficient to justify a cross-claim, and the second may or
may not be considered in the public interest."'O
The second weakness is that since the section 1201.5 test is unreliable for
SLAPP defendants when it is used as a basis for extracting attorney's fees from
the SLAPP plaintiff,141 there is little reason to believe it would work any better
for malicious prosecution.
In summary, the existing solutions to SLAPPs fail to solve the problem
primarily because they have too little impact on the economic incentives that
motivate these suits. Further, they fail to achieve the goals of reducing the
impact on the target because they (1) generally increase rather than decrease the
total amount of litigation; (2) do not guarantee a recovery of economic loss for
the defendant; (3) occur too late in the process to thwart the goals of the
plaintiff; and (4) are too difficult to invoke.
136. Brecher, supra note 34, at 125-28.
137. Id at 138.
138. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980).
139. Sive, supra note 43, at 27, col. 2.
140. But see Westfield Partners, 740 F. Supp. 523, where the court determined that petitioning
to have a roadway vacated as a public highway was protected by the first amendment.
141. Brecher, supra note 34, at 135-36. "[U]nder the present state of the law, [§ 1201.5] it is
unwise for intimidation defendants to rely too heavily on extracting their fees from plaintiffs." Id. at
136.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Two proposals could feasibly eliminate SLAPPs. The first involves devising a
new judicial application of the existing legal solutions. The second requires
legislative action in creating an entirely new solution.142 This Section analyzes
each proposal and recommends modifications for making them more effective
in eliminating SLAPPs. There are several features common to both these
proposals which serve as hallmarks to any successful SLAPP solution. First,
both proposals place greater initial burdens on a potential SLAPP plaintiff,
requiring that party to do more than merely file an ordinary complaint to initiate
the lawsuit. Second, both proposals require preliminary hearings early in the
process. Finally, both solutions require the plaintiff to pay the defendant's
attorney's fees and costs in the event the defendant prevails.
A. A New Judicial Solution
In Webb v. Fury,143 Justice Neely's dissent described a new judicial remedy to
SLAPPs which he believed the West Virginia Supreme Court had both the
power and the occasion to implement. In Webb, the petitioners were Rick
Webb, Webb's non-profit Braxton Environmental Action Programs, Inc., and
Mountain Stream Monitors, an unincorporated association. Petitioners sought
a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from proceeding with a tort
action filed by DLM Coal Corporation ("DLM"). The petitioners contended that
their actions were protected by their right of petition and of free speech, and
therefore the lower court was prohibited from proceeding. 144
In the circuit court action, DLM claimed the petitioners had libeled DLM and
also damaged its commercial interests through communications the petitioners
exchanged with government agencies. These communications consisted of (1) an
administrative complaint filed with the Office of Surface Mining ("OSM"),
United States Department of the Interior, claiming that DLM was in violation
of the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977,145 and (2) a request for
an evidentiary hearing before the United States Environmental Protection
142. Several suggestions have been made for executive branch remedies. These include the
filing of amicus curiae briefs in favor of SLAPP defendants by the state attorneys general, the direct
intervention of state attorneys general on behalf of SLAPP defendants (Pring, supra note 4, at 16),
and county government funded "citizens' legal defense funds" to provide SLAPP defendants with the
money to hire an attorney (Abrams, supra note 28, at 43). Although these measures would
undoubtedly be helpful, they would do little to reduce the filing of SLAPPs because they achieve few
if any of the five objectives outlined in Section II.A, supra.
143. Webb, 167 W. Va. 434, 282 S.E.2d 28.
144. IM at 436, 282 S.E.2d at 31.
145. Id at 437,282 S.E.2d at 31. OSM's investigation into surface runoff from DLM mines was
inconclusive and no enforcement action was taken. Id. at 438, 282 S.E.2d at 31-32.
[Vol. 27
24
California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol27/iss2/8
ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTION TO SLAPP Surrs
Agency ("EPA"), claiming that DLM was in violation of the Clean Water
Act.14 The defamation occurred in a newsletter published by Mountain
Stream Monitors containing an editorial criticizing strip mining. Without
mentioning DLM, the newsletter implied that the criticism was aimed at DLM
by indicating DLM owned parcels on a map that accompanied the article.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, considering the petitioners'
claim of a violation of their first amendment right of free speech and of petition,
applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 147 and held that both the newsletter and
the direct communications with the government agencies were protected."4
The court granted petitioner's request for a writ of prohibition.149
Dissenting Justice Neely took exception to the majority's decision to grant
absolute immunity to the defendants."0 While recognizing the "potential for
chilling legitimate first amendment rights when there is anything less than
absolute immunity is awe inspiring,""' Neely feared that the blanket immunity
would protect genuine torts "masquerad[ing] as an act of petitioning the
government."1 2 In his dissent, he outlined a three-part solution that would
"screen legitimate first amendment activity from irresponsible or sham first
amendment activity."1 3
First, Justice Neely proposed use of the court's judicial rule-making power to
modify the state rules of civil procedure so that, instead of requiring mere notice
pleading, in cases where plaintiffs sought damages for conduct that is prima facie
protected by the first amendment, 5 4 the plaintiff must plead "more specific
allegations than would otherwise be required.""5
146. An evidentiary hearing may be granted by the EPA as part of its permit issuing process
under the Clean Water Act. In this case, DLM was attempting to consolidate some existing permits
which provided Webb with an opportunity to request the hearing. The court was uncertain whether
a hearing was ever held. The EPA granted the permits and later attempted to partially withdraw
them. DLM obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent the withdrawal. The EPA and DLM
eventually settled their dispute by stipulation when the EPA agreed to rescind the withdrawal and
DLM agreed not to mine certain new sources pending an EPA investigation Id at 438-39,282 S.E.2d
at 32.
147. See supra Section III.B.
148. Webb, 167 W. Va. at 459-60, 282 S.E.2d at 43.
149. Id
150. Justice Neely was not alone in taking this position. See Smith, 562 F. Supp. at 842. See
also Pring, supra note 60, at 17, col. 1 (The Webb decision may have been overruled by McDonald,
472 U.S. 479.).
151. Webb, 167 W.Va. at 466, 282 S.E.2d at 46 (Neely, J., dissenting).
152. Id at 461, 282 S.E.2d at 43 (Neely, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 466, 282 S.E.2d at 46 (Neely, J., dissenting).
154. This SLAPP response would protect all activity falling under the scope of the first
amendment rather than just activity found to be in the "public interest." This is critical to protect first
amendment activity. See infa note 183.
155. "[W]here a plaintiff seeks damages or injunctive relief, or both, for conduct which is a [sic]
prima facie protected by the first amendment, the danger that the mere pendency of the action will
chill the exercise of first amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise
be required." Webb, 167 W. Va. at 467, 282 S.E.2d at 47 (Neely, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority
opinion in Franchise Realty, 542 F.2d at 1076, 1082-83). Note that Schauer believes that Franchise
Really provides more protection than the Supreme Court authorized. Schauer, supra note 55, at 714.
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Second, Justice Neely proposed requiring a preliminary hearing early In the
proceedings in which the trial judge would decide whether the plaintiff has
enough facts to go forward and whether the suit is brought in good faith."6
The court would also order the plaintiff to advance the defendant the costs of
discovery needed to get to this preliminary hearing.5 7 In the event that the
plaintiff ultimately prevailed on the merits, the advance on costs would be
refunded." 8
Third, a plaintiff who lost in trial on the merits would be required to
reimburse the defendant for full costs, including attorney's fees, without
exception. Also, if the court found the plaintiff was actually abusing the judicial
process to chill first amendment rights, the court would impose additional costs
on the plaintiff, beyond those actually incurred by the defendant.59 Justice
Neely believed this requirement would prevent the chilling effect of these
lawsuits by requiring the plaintiff to pay for the costs of defense.16°
As proposed, this solution would meet most of the objectives of a an effective
solution to the SLAPP problem. It protects the defendant from the costs of
litigation, resolves the suit quickly through a preliminary hearing, and provides
for economic sanctions to reduce the incentive to sue.161  Justice Neely's
proposal also complies with the limitations required of an effective solution. It
has safeguards built in to prevent abuse because it involves judicial oversight
from the start. It also places a greater burden on the plaintiff for specificity in
pleading, which will help identify the suit as a SLAPP. Finally, this solution
provides a measured response to the problem that is neither reactionary nor a
potential defense for malicious "petitioning" activity. The only necessary
modification to this solution would be to require the courts to report the
plaintiff's attorney to the state bar disciplinary committee if they find that the
suit was intended to chill first amendment rights. 62
156. Webb, 167 W. Va. at 467-68,282 S.E.2d at 47 (Neely, J. dissenting) (quoting Mauck v. City
of Martinsburg, 167 V. Va. 332, 337, 280 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1981) ('[W]henever there is a first
amendment defense to actions under state law the state court is required to be a judge of both the
facts and the law.')).
157. Id
158. Id.
159. Id (referencing W. VA. CODE § 59-2-11 (Michie Supp. 1989) C"nor shall anything in this
article take away or abridge the discretion of a court of equity over the subject of costs... ."); W. VA.
R. Civ. P. 54(d) (Michie 1990) CExcept when express provision therefor is made either in a statute
of this State or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs... 1)).
160. Webb, 167 W. Va. at 467-68,282 S.E.2d at 47 (Neely, . dissenting). This requirement may
limit this judicial solution to state courts since federal courts are prohibited from awarding attorney's
fees to the prevailing party in the absence of Congressional authority through express statutory
provisions. Alyeka Pipeline, 421 U.S. 240. But, if a federal court were to determine that the suit was
not justified it could conceivably exercise its Rule 11 power to sanction the plaintiff for the equivalent
of attorney's fees. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note 109.
161. This is a critical feature of Justice Neely's solution. See supra Section II.A.5. for a
discussion of how and why such measures should be applied.
162. As shown earlier, filing one of these suits is typically a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. See supra Section III.F.
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B. A New Legislative Solution
California, like many states where real estate development has been rapid, has
seen a dramatic rise in the number of SLAPPs filed. t63 In response, the
California Legislature introduced and passed an addition to the California Code
of Civil Procedure.16 Though this bill was vetoed by the Governor of Califor-
nia,16 it was recently reintroduced in the California Senate'6 and considering
the overwhelming support it received in the California Legislature last session,
it is likely to pass again. 67 Moreover, it is worthwhile to analyze this bill
because it may serve as a model for laws in other states.16
As drafted, 69 the bill is designed to protect a person's exercise of first
163. "SLAPPs have become particularlywidespread in areas-including California, Colorado, and
New York-where the quality of life is high, since developers are more likely to try to make a lot of
money in these areas." Colino, supra note 17, at 21.
164. This bill, S.B. No. 2313, was introduced into the California Senate on February 27, 1990
by Senator Bill Lockyer, S.B. 2313,1989-90 Leg., Reg. Sess. (1990). It was passed, after amendments,
in the Senate (33 Ayes to 5 Noes) on May 24, 1990. On August 27, 1990 it was passed, after
amendments, in the assembly (77 Ayes to 0 Noes). On August 31, 1990 the Senate concurred in
Assembly changes (29 Ayes to 5 Noes). CAIJFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE WEEKLY HISrORY 641
(Oct. 4, 1990).
165. The bill was vetoed on September 26, 1990. The Governor believes there are enough
protections against frivolous suits and that 'judges should be encouraged to impose liberal sanctions
against parties who file such lawsuits." Sotero, Governor Vetos Bill to Quell "SLAPF' Suits, Gannett
News Service, Sept. 27, 1990.
166. S.B. No. 10, 1991-92 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Dec. 3, 1990); CAIFORNIA LEGISLATuRE, SENATE
DAILY HLsTORtY 6 (Dec. 4, 1990).
167. Since California elected a new governor on November 7,1990, there is a better chance that
this bill will be signed into law.
168. Riesenfeld, Law-Making and Legislative Precedent in American Legal History, 33 MINN. L
REV. 103 (1949) (discussing the tendency of legislatures to adopt statutory solutions from other
jurisdictions).
New York is currently considering a bill that would curb SLAPPs. This bill accelerates the process
for dismissal of the suit, places a burden on the plaintiff to show a substantial basis in law to avoid
dismissal, treats plaintiffs as public figures in defamation actions arising from statements made in
public debates, awards defendant's costs and attorney's fees and allows compensatory and punitive
damages to be awarded to the defendant. Spencer, BillAimed at CurbingRetaliatory Suits, N.Y. LI.,
Oct. 3, 1990, at p. 1. Washington state passed a bill designed to reduce SLAPPs in 1988. This bill
immunizes parties who have made good faith communications to government from civil liability and
allows prevailing defendants to recover attorney's fees and costs. It also allows government agencies
or the attorney general to intervene and defend parties who have been sued for communicating with
the government. If the government intervenes, attorney's fees may be awarded to either prevailing
party. WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 4.24.500, .510, .520 (1991). Realistically, this bill does nothing
more than provide attorney's fees because the limited immunity granted already exists under the
United States Constitution as expressed in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See supra Section III.B.
169. The proposed bill provides:
Section 1. Section 425.16 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure, to read:
425.16. (a) No cause of action against a person arising from any act of the person in furtherance
of his or her first amendment right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue,
shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing the
pleading, after the court determines that the party seeking to file the pleading has established
that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. The court may
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amendment free speech and petition rights from the chilling effect of me'itless
lawsuits. 7 It would achieve this objective in two ways. First, the bill prohibits
a claim which arises from an act taken in furtherance of a person's first
amendment right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.171
The court can only issue that order upon a showing by the plaintiff that there
is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.' 72
Failure to comply subjects the pleading to a motion to strike.173 Second, if the
defendant prevails, he or she would be entitled to recover attorney's fees and
CoStS.
174
This bill was opposed by the California State Bar Committee on the
Administration of Justice on two grounds.175 First, the Bar Committee asserted
that protection against frivolous actions currently exists and "judges should be
encouraged to impose liberal sanctions against parties and their attorneys who
file SLAPP suits."176 Second, malicious prosecution actions against such suits
should be encouraged. 177 This opposition is not well-founded. This Comment
has shown that the existing solutions, including sanctions and malicious
prosecution suits, cannot work to stem this type of litigation. 178
Notwithstanding any questions of statutory interpretation of the actual
allow the filing of a pleading that includes that claim following the filing of a verified petition,
accompanied by the proposed pleading and supporting affidavits, stating the facts upon which
the liability is based. The court shall order service of the petition upon the party against whom
the action is proposed to be filed and permit that party to submit opposing affidavits prior to
making its determination. The filing of the petition, proposed pleading, and accompanying
affidavits shall toll the running of any applicable statute of limitations until the final determina-
tion of the matter, which ruling, if favorable to the petitioning party, shall permit the proposed
pleading to be filed.
If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a substantial probability that he or
she will prevail on the claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall
be admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case, and no burden of proof or degree of
proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that determination. To the extent that any
pleading does not comply with the requirements of this section, it shall be subject to a motion
to strike.(b) In any action subject to subdivision (a), a prevailing defendant shall be entitled to
recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.
S.B. 10, 1991-92 Leg., Reg. Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Lockyer Bill Text].
170. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, 1989-1990 Leg., Reg. Sess., REPORT ON SB 2313, at 2
[hereinafter Lockyer Bill Report].
171. Lockyer Bill Text, supra note 169.
172. M, This probability showing is denied evidentiary value if the claim is allowed. Id
Compare thiswith similar pleading hurdles that have been established through CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 425.13-.15 (West 1990).
173. Lockyer Bill Text, supra note 169.
174. Id
175. Lockyer Bill Report, supra note 170, at 4.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra Section III. It is, however, admirable to try to solve the SLAPP problem with
existing law because doing so would both show the cohesiveness and internal safeguards of the legal
system and also achieve the desirable goal of minimizing the complexity of the law by accomplishing
as much as possible with as few laws as possible.
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language of the bill, including a definition of "substantial probability,"17 this
bill achieves several of the goals of a successful SLAPP response. First, it
protects the defendant by providing economic relief through attorney's fees, 18
and provides for a speedy, preliminary decision. Second, it also takes the very
important step of making the solution offensive rather than defensive. In theory,
the proposed statute puts the burden on the plaintiff to substantially prove the
case before the pleading is filed. Unfortunately, even with the application of
attorney's fees for the defendants, this bill would not fully achieve the goal of
eliminating economic incentives to file SLAPPs.
The bill should be amended so that in the event the defendant prevails, he or
she would recover statutory damages which should be reasonably equivalent to
plaintiff's projected profits if the petitioning action had been silenced. This type
of penalty strikes directly at the economic incentive that causes business
organizations to file SLAPPs. In addition, the bill should also be modified to
specifically require the court to report the attorney filing a SLAPP to the state
bar disciplinary committee for investigation.181 Finally, the bill should not
restrict its protection only to acts of free speech involving "a public issue"
182
because this term will probably be construed to exclude cases where the petition
to government furthers the interests of a narrow group of people.
183
With such modifications, the bill would then achieve all the objectives
discussed earlier. It would also fit within the limitations required of an
acceptable solution. The bill requires judicial review of the pleadings to avoid
reactionary responses. Also, it uses a special determination hearing to overcome
the scarcity of facts, allowing valid claims to be tried and invalid claims to be
dismissed. Finally, it does not provide any blanket immunity behind which actual
defamation or other tortious conduct can hide.
CONCLUSION
The major tasks required to solve a problem are recognizing the problem's
cause, measuring the problem's extent, and considering the tools available to
solve it. With SLAPPs, the cause is relatively clear: the availability of the legal
system to business entities as an effective and economically feasible means of
179. Compare this term with the same term in CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13 (West 1990),
which has not yet been subjected to judicial interpretation at the appellate level.
180. It is not clear from the text of the bill whether the defendant is entitled to attorney's fees
for the cost of the special determination on substantial probability of success if the case never gets
beyond that point. To be effective, attorney's fees for this portion of the proceeding must be awarded
to the defendant even if the case never gets to trial.
181. See supra Section III.F.
182. Lockyer Bill Text, supra note 169.
183. As discussed earlier, this is a valid use of petitioning under the first amendment which must
be protected from SLAPPs. No distinction between "public interest" and "private interest" petitioning
should be drawn in any solution proposed to protect petitioning citizens from SLAPPs. The only
permissible distinction is between legitimate petitioning and "sham" petitioning. See supra notes 76-78,
86 & 154.
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eliminating political opposition. The exact extent of the problem, however, is
not as clear. While more data on the extent of the problem is desirable, it is not
necessary.184 Based on the information available, it is apparent that the SLAPP
problem is widespread and growing. Further, its extent is magnified by its ability
to chill the petitioning activities of people who are not even parties to the
litigation. Therefore, an effective response to this problem is required
immediately. This Comment has considered the existing tools available to
respond to the problem of SLAPPs and has found them lacking. New solutions,
either judicial or legislative in origin, must be advanced and implemental.
Judicial lawmaking has worked throughout common law history as a valuable,
effective, and measured response to social problems. As shown, however, the
courts must be willing to exercise their considerable powers to fashion new
procedural remedies and apply their sanctioning power to sharply curtail the
growth of SLAPPs. Legislative responses, such as California's proposed
amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, can probably produce a better
solution because legislatures have greater flexibility than courts in fashioning
remedies.
Until these new solutions are implemented, defendants must act to protect
themselves. Understanding the available procedural and substantive defenses
they have will allow defendants to undertake their petitioning with the
confidence that the legal system will support them. Further, in learning the
limits of their rights under the first amendment, defendants will be able to
conduct their petitioning within the limits protected by the Constitution.
It is important to remember that the plaintiffs in SLAPPs generally have a
legitimate grievance since they will lose prospective profits if the petitioning
party is successful. Nevertheless, resolution in the courts is not the correct way
of handling this grievance because it ignores the true nature of the dispute and
focuses on the tactics the defendant used in declaring his or her position. The
dispute should be left in the political forum where it can be decided without the
all or nothing, win or lose judgments which often constrain the courts. Instead,
the interests of several parties must be weighed and compared in light of the
community's best interest as well as the interests of the disputing parties. In the
political forum, compromise is an effective and often-used form of dispute
resolution and perhaps the one most suited to conflicts between groups that will,
because of their proximity in the community, encounter each other continuous-ly.185
An effective solution to SLAPPs is the only way to keep these disputes in
the political forum where they belong. The solution must do more than merely
help the defendant; it must cut to the heart of the problem and eliminate the
cause, specifically the economic incentive to employ SLAPPs. Judicial and
184. Canan and Pring have continued their research by expanding their quantitative analysis and
undertaking a detailed qualitative study of eleven selected SLAPPs. They are also conducting a
nationwide survey of politically involved citizens. Pring, supra note 4, at 8.
185. This is not to suggest that law and politics are separate forces, but rather to suggest that
courts make poor forums for the resolution of SLAPPs. But see Stein, supra note 65, at 47.
[Vol. 27
30
California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol27/iss2/8
1991] ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTION TO SLAPP Surrs 429
legislative solutions must do more than make the chasm wide, they must make
it deep.
Vctor . Cosentino*
* This Comment is dedicated with love to Susan Elizabeth Crowley.
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